# $\mathbf{RSA}$

#### **MATH 195**

#### Algebraic Setup

We begin with a theorem from group theory:

**Theorem** (Lagrange). If G is a finite group,  $\#G = n < \infty$ , then for all  $g \in G$ , one has  $g^n = e$ .

Quick proof, G abelian. Fix  $g \in G$ , then  $G \to G$  by  $x \mapsto gx$  is bijective (the map  $x \mapsto g^{-1}x$  is its inverse. Hence

$$\prod_{y \in G} y = \prod_{x \in G} (gx) = g^n \prod_{x \in G} x$$

so  $e = g^n$ .

Special case: Let k be a finite field, #k = q. Then for all  $\alpha \in k^*$ ,  $\alpha^{q-1} = 1$ . Apply Lagrange's theorem to  $G = k^* = k \setminus \{0\}$ . Including  $\alpha = 0$ , we have for all  $\alpha \in k$ ,  $\alpha^q = \alpha$ .

*Example.* If  $k = \mathbb{F}_p = \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$ , for p prime, then  $a^p = a$  for all  $a \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$ , in other words, we have the (little) theorem of Fermat: for all integers  $a \in \mathbb{Z}$ ,  $a^p \equiv a \pmod{p}$  for p prime.

Notice that for all  $a \in (\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^*$ ,  $a^{p-1} = 1$ ,  $a^{2(p-1)} = 1$ , and so on, so that  $a^{\ell} = 1$  if  $\ell \equiv 0 \pmod{p-1}$ . Then for all  $a \in \mathbb{Z}$ , and all  $m \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}$  such that  $m \equiv 1 \pmod{p-1}$ ,  $a^m \equiv a \pmod{p}$ .

**Proposition.** Let p and q be two prime numbers,  $p \neq q$ , and put n = pq. Then for all positive integers  $m \equiv 1 \pmod{(p-1, q-1)}$  and all  $a \in \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$ , one has  $a^m = a \pmod{(n \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z})}$ , which is to say

$$a^m \equiv a \pmod{n}$$

for all integers a.

Recall that the *least common multiple* of integers k and  $\ell$  is the smallest positive integer divisible both by k and by  $\ell$ . For example, lcm(12, 18) = 36. Note that  $lcm(k, \ell) = k\ell/\gcd(k, \ell)$ . Note then that if  $m \equiv 1 \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$ , then  $m \equiv 1 \pmod{(p-1, q-1)}$ .

This proposition is the backbone of the RSA cryptosystem.

*Proof.* Take  $a \in \mathbb{Z}$ . Then  $m \equiv 1 \pmod{p-1}$ , since  $\operatorname{lcm}(p-1, q-1) \mid (m-1)$  but by definition  $(p-1) \mid \operatorname{lcm}(p-1, q-1)$ . So by Fermat's little theorem,  $a^m \equiv a \pmod{p}$  which is to say  $p \mid (a^m - a)$ . The same is true for q, so  $q \mid (a^m - a)$ . Hence

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 $n = pq \mid (a^m - a)$ , since it is divisible by these distinct primes, and hence  $a^m \equiv a \pmod{n}$ .

*Remark.* We can get this from Lagrange's theorem. We take  $G = (\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z})^*$ . We have

$$#G = \phi(n) = \phi(pq) = \phi(p)\phi(q) = (p-1)(q-1).$$

Therefore for all  $a \in (\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z})^*$ ,  $a^{(p-1)(q-1)} \equiv 1 \pmod{pq}$ . But this only gives us the statement for the product (p-1)(q-1), and only for elements  $a \in (\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z})^*$ .

*Example.* Take p = 5, q = 7, and lcm(p-1, q-1) = lcm(4, 6) = 12. Take  $m = 13 \equiv 1 \pmod{12}$ , and a = 2, then  $2^{13} \equiv 2 \pmod{35}$ , hence  $5 \cdot 7 \mid 8190 = 2 \cdot 3^2 \cdot 5 \cdot 7 \cdot 13$ .

Note that for all  $m \equiv 1 \pmod{p-1}$ ,  $2^m \equiv 2 \pmod{p}$ , so  $2^{13} \equiv 2 \pmod{p}$  for every prime p for which  $(p-1) \mid 12$ , i.e. p-1 = 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 12, or p = 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 13, but 4 is not prime, so we could have known already that  $2 \cdot 3 \cdot 5 \cdot 7 \cdot 13 \mid 8190$ .

## RSA CRYPTOSYTEM

Recall we have Alice sending a message to Bob, with Eve listening.

The RSA-system is a block cipher,  $\mathcal{P} = \mathcal{C} = \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$  for an integer n = pq, where n (the *modulus*) is known to everybody, but the prime factors p, q are known only to Bob. We need in practice p and q to be very large (over 100 digits, say). We take  $\mathcal{K}$  to be the set of positive integers relatively prime to lcm(p-1, q-1). The *encryption key*  $e \in \mathcal{K}$  is known to everyone, but the *decryption key*  $d \in \mathcal{K}$  is known only to Bob. Then Alice encrypts:

$$E: \mathcal{P} \times \mathcal{K} \to \mathcal{C}$$
$$E(a, e) = a^e \pmod{n}$$

Eve knows  $a^e$ , e, and n, but does not know a. To decrypt, Bob

$$D: \mathcal{C} \times \mathcal{K} \to \mathcal{P}$$
  
 $D(b, e) = b^d \pmod{n}$ 

where  $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\operatorname{lcm}(p-1, q-1)}$ .

Claim. For all a, e, D(E(a, e), e) = a, since

$$D(E(a,e),e) = D(a^e,e) = (a^e)^d = a^{de} \equiv a \pmod{n}$$

by the proposition.

Warning: Given n = pq, and a multiple of lcm(p-1, q-1), one can compute p and q. For example, in the special case that we are given  $\phi(n) = (p-1)(q-1) = pq - p - q + 1$ , we note that

$$(x-p)(x-q) = x^{2} - (p+q)x + pq = x^{2} - (n+1-\phi(n))x + n.$$

is a polynomial which gives the values of p and q by the quadratic formula. Therefore the secrets are in some sense equivalent: knowing p, q is equivalent to knowing  $\phi(n)$ , and vice versa.

Why is prime factorization a difficult problem? Only a historical one: it is an age-old problem, for centuries people have been thinking about it, but no fast methods have been arrived upon.